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RECONCILIATION WITHOUT VIOLENCE 
 
Is it possible to solve conflicts without using violence, or is the use of violent retribution 
necessary to solve problems and restore peace after serious crimes and offences? Is some sort 
of revenge or retribution necessary in a reconciliation process as a matter of justice? In this 
article I will go some rounds with these extremely complex questions, and I will try to show 
that the same philosophical patterns and ethical dilemmas turn up in different professions. 
These are classical questions in the philosophy of law and in all the disciplines dealing with 
conflict resolution and mediation. They are more relevant than ever, in the tribunal in 
Cambodia dealing with the awful crimes against humanity committed by Red Kmehr, and in 
various nations, the Nordic countries included, who now rewrite their criminal codes and 
reform their judicial systems. In this article I will underline that the questions about violence 
and reconciliation are also deeply relevant for Christian theology: Is violent atonement a 
possible and sustainable concept in theology and Christology today? 
 I often include empirical work in my research in theology, criminology and ethics. In 
my books on Ethics of punishment and Forgiveness1 I used the reflections from men 
convicted of homicide and women who had experienced rape and sexual abuse. The 
experiences and reflections of the offenders and the victims served as starting points for my 
theological and philosophical analyses. In my latest book on Reconciliation2 I have several 
voices in the text: Sons who grew up with violent fathers, victims of offences from daily life 
and therapists with experience as mediators contribute to the reflections. I have asked them all 
to tell me their stories about conflict resolution and reconciliation. This way of researching 
and exploring can be called “empirical informed theology”. Interviews and fieldwork can in 
many cases enrich theological and ethical discourses. The procedure is inspired from 
Sociology and Social Anthropology, but also from philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein3. 
He recommended his students to explore how a phenomenon is spoken about in the languages 
of daily life as the first steps in a philosophical analysis. Similarly I find the experiences of 
victims and offenders highly relevant for theologians and philosophers who deal with the 
phenomenon of reconciliation.   
 
Three violent patriarchs 
  
The three sons4 I interviewed have survived extremely traumatic childhoods under the 
dominance of fathers who became violent patriarchs and oppressors in the families. They 
have showed me a part of Norwegian childhood history I hardly knew existed. They have 
important stories to tell about survival and acceptance, maybe also about reconciliation. Arne 
and Bjørn are now in their early forties, Mogens has passed fifty. They are truly survivors. 
Two of them lost their mothers early. The women died after serious physical violence and 
abuse. Bjørn killed his father when he was 16, and spent the next 5 years of his youth in 
prison. Arne and his sister had to take care of their little brother after the death of their 
mother. All three women tried to get away from their violent husbands. Mogens’ mother was 
the only one who succeeded. She managed to build a new life for herself and the children, in 
poverty, but without physical violence.  
 The three stories have some differences: Bjørn grew up in poverty on an isolated farm 
in the hills on the west coast far away from any neighbors. Mogens lived in the centre of the 
biggest city in Norway, and his family was also poor. Arne’s father was a charming and well 
respected man in a small town, and the family belonged to the middle class. The surroundings 
have been different for the three sons, but they tell very similar stories about what happened 
inside the families: The fathers beat the mothers often and seriously. They also used violence 
against the children. The physical violence was only one part of the brutal regime in the 
families: Harassment, pestering, humiliating, neglecting were other parts of it. They grew up 
in constant fear of the next violent outburst. The neighbors and other family members knew a 
lot about what happened in the families. The police and the local public child care knew. But 
no one interfered. No one had the courage to intervene in the families to stop the violence and 
side with the victims. The women, the children and the violent men were let alone with their 
massive problems. 
 The fathers never said they were sorry for the harm they inflicted on their wives and 
children. They never admitted guilt and took no responsibility for the sufferings of the 
families. On the contrary: They justified the violence, either as “just dessert” and deserved 
punishment, or as understandable aggression because life was so difficult for the fathers. In 
the families these three men were dominating patriarchs with all rights and no visible sign of 
remorse and self-criticism. They became grotesque exemplars of the mankind R.W. Connell 
described as hegemonic masculinity5. And the two fathers who survived went on in the same 
direction for the rest of their lives, according to Arne and Mogens: They have never taken the 
blame for their violent behavior and oppression, and never showed any sense of guilt. The 
questions about forgiveness and reconciliation are therefore very difficult for the sons. 
 
Nonviolent masculinities 
 
According to deterministic theories about the influence of childhood for the life as a grown 
up, these three sons should have gotten terrible futures, turning the careers as victims into 
later careers as offenders. But one shall always be careful when using knowledge collected on 
a macro level in the lives of individuals. A life is always complex and mysterious. It is 
certainly true that families and societies with a high degree of violence and oppression recruit 
new offenders and oppressors, new losers. But it is not always true! Arne, Bjørn and Mogens 
are living examples of the opposite. They are nonviolent men and fathers today. They have all 
lived with the same woman for many years and have several children. They have never used 
violence in the family. They are well educated and have got safe jobs. How could it happen? I 
do not have the answers. This is not a psychological study of how to survive extreme 
childhoods. I have just listened to their stories, and these narratives also include fascinating 
reflections from men who had to deconstruct the images of fatherhood and manhood they 
grew up with, and struggle to construct other images of masculinity, other ways of being men. 
They had to dethrone the violent patriarch in their lives and find a different manhood, 
different masculine strategies.  
It is difficult for a son to rebel against his Imago Patri. Arne and Bjørn tell me how 
difficult it was to resemble their fathers physically. They looked alike, and that was a threat. 
“To be a different man” became existential. Arne went away and served some years in the 
army, in a very tough and demanding unit. Afterwards he completed a long education in 
psychology and medical care. Bjørn met an older man with background from Foreign Legion 
in prison when he was 17 years old. This man had authority and respect among the prisoners. 
“He took over the care for me,” Bjørn tells. He came into the prison as a skinny youngster 
weighing hardly 60 kilos and left five years later as a heavy weight lifter at 120 kilos. He 
became extremely strong: “I had to be stronger than my father so that I shouldn’t fear him any 
longer.” Bjørn also served in the army for a period of time, and afterwards he completed 
higher academic education. Mogens studied sociology, criminology and philosophy. Today he 
is a established researcher in criminology and victimology. 
Bjørn shot his father to death when he was 16 and got 5 years in prison. The sentence 
was disputed. People tell him that he wouldn’t have been sent to prison at all if the homicide 
had happened 20 years later. Bjørn disagree. He finds the sentence fair and tells me that he 
doesn’t want a society which leaves homicides unpunished. He also says that the prison saved 
him, in a way: It gave him a new start, a possibility to get an education and to become a 
sportsman, a different man than his father was.  
Arne and Mogens have kept in contact with their fathers in all the years since their 
childhood, and they have taken care of them when they got helpless and ill in old days. Is this 
a sign of reconciliation? Maybe. But all the three sons tell me that reconciliation for them first 
of all means to leave the violent childhood behind and accept that it is no longer possible to 
change it. They tell me that the reconciliation process starts as a reflexive process: My 
possibilities to be reconciled with my own background and story, my own narrative of life. A 
full reconciliation with the offending fathers is not possible for these sons. Bjørn’s father is 
dead. The two other fathers went on denying and justifying themselves right to the very end. 
It is extremely difficult to reconcile with an offender who in his own eyes has done nothing 
wrong. It is very hard, maybe impossible, to forgive an innocent person. But Bjørn says: “If 
God chose to forgive my father, I will have nothing against it.” 
If reconciliation means a full restoration of a broken relationship, these three sons are 
not reconciled with their fathers. I still mean that these men have taught me a lot about 
reconciliation. They have succeeded in dethroning the violent patriarchs from their own lives 
and showed themselves and their surroundings that it is possible to live others lives as men 
and fathers than what they grew up with. They have fought themselves free from an 
oppressing and dangerous Imago Patri and they have stood up against the strong forces which 
will push sons into Imitatio Patri. They have learned to live with their memories and 
narratives in ways where they no longer dominate and strangle the present time. Their 
reconciliation includes first of all themselves and their past. A full reconciliation with the 
fathers has been impossible. 
 
Reframing 
 
Bjørn became interested in his father’s background some years ago. He recognized that he 
knew very little, and he contacted his aunt, a younger sister of the father. She could tell 
another story of a childhood in isolation, violence and abuse, another story of a violent 
patriarch: Bjørns grandfather. They visited the cottage in the hills where this family lived fifty 
years ago, and Bjørn got some new images of his father: As a little boy, a frightened child. 
Therapists and mediators call this experience reframing 6. It is an important step in dealing 
with conflicts: A change in focus, a possibility to see that the offender is not identical with the 
offence. He is something more than his violent deeds. This step is of great importance in 
conflict resolution, but is it reconciliation?   
Bjørn raises the question of forgiveness in this way: “Who should I forgive? My father 
when he was a frightened child? My father when he bet my mother to death? And who should 
forgive him? Bjørn when he was seven years and saw his mother dead on the kitchen table? 
Bjørn when he is in his forties?”  
The three sons have not forgiven their fathers. Nevertheless they have gone through a 
reconciliation process. If forgiveness implies to let go of resentment and anger, it is 
understandable that they haven’t forgiven. They are still angry when they talk about the awful 
practice of their fathers. They still show resentment when they tell me that the fathers went on 
in their lives with no visible signs of remorse and admission of guilt. In my opinion, however, 
resentment and forgiveness are not phenomena which exclude each other mutually. 
 
Resentment and moral anger 
  
It should be possible to forgive the offender without letting go of the resentment against the 
offences. The moral anger is important in the healing process of victims of violence. This 
anger says: “It was wrong, and it was not my fault! I didn’t deserve it!” I first learned about 
the importance of the moral anger from sexual abused women in my work on forgiveness7, 
and the sons of the violent fathers tell a similar story: Violence and abuse humiliate and 
belittle. Afterwards the victims fight to get back on their feet again, they struggle to stand 
upright and regain their dignity. The moral anger, the victims own anger and that of 
supporting and comforting others, is of great importance in this process. Therefore it is so 
wrong and dangerous to set up wrath and forgiveness as mutual excluding alternatives. “No 
one can forgive when she lies down,” wrote one of the abused women to me. “One has to get 
up on ones feet again!” 
The American philosopher Jeffry Murphy8 has in several books warned against a naïve 
teaching about forgiveness which put up forgiveness and resentment as alternatives. He 
defends what he calls “retributive emotions”, feelings and emotions which show that the 
victims resist what happened to them. His defense of these emotions is of moral character. If 
forgiveness really means to let go of all hard feelings, it comes very close to ethical 
ignorance: “O.K. It wasn’t that bad. We can put it behind us and go on.” Murphy is an 
advocate for “moral hatred”, wrath and resentment. He argues primarily philosophically and 
ethically, but also psychologically. Of course he can see that real forgiveness that happens 
without any sort of pressure from the surroundings can be liberating for the victim. But he 
strongly warns against a dichotomy where forgiveness means health and resentment and anger 
mean pathology. I quote from Murphy’s foreword to Thomas Brudholms book Resentment’s 
virtue9: 
 
Selective and considered forgiveness may indeed reveal virtue in victims of 
wrongdoing, may legitimately free those victims from being consumed by unhealthy 
resentments, and may aid in restoring relations that are worth restoring. None of this, 
however, shows that forgiveness is always a virtue, that all resentments are unhealthy, 
and that all relationships are worth restoring. 
 
Forgiveness in South Africa 
 
Jeffry Murphy has for years been among the most competent critics of The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa10, and first of all of Desmond Tutus preaching and 
writing about forgiveness as the undisputable number one solution in conflict solving 
processes. Murphy criticizes Tutus mixture of theological, political and therapeutic languages. 
He strongly warns against a widespread tendency to increase the dominance of therapeutic 
language and use it as equivalent to moral and religious languages. Surely, Murphy has got 
some very important points. Desmond Tutu’s famous book with the programmatic title No 
Future Without Forgiveness11argues that forgiveness is the best possible way to health and 
recovering for individuals and groups who became victimized of the Apartheid regime. Tutu 
elaborates forgiveness as a universal virtue with the same importance in all cultures where 
people struggle to move on from violent conflicts and even from genocides. And Murphy is 
also right when he points to the mixture of therapeutic and religious languages in the writings 
of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Here is a famous part from Tutus book (p. 273): 
 
In the act of forgiveness we are declaring our faith in the future of a relationship and in 
the capacity of the wrongdoer to make a new beginning on a course that will be 
different from the one that caused us the wrong. We are saying here is a chance to 
make a new beginning. It is an act of faith that the wrongdoer can change. According 
to Jesus we should be ready to do this not just once, not just seven times, but seventy 
times seven, without limit – provides, it seems Jesus says, your brother or sister who 
has wronged you is ready to come and confess the wrong they have committed yet 
again.  
 
 I can read the words of Tutu into my own family life and find them meaningful. I can 
use them in my closest circle of friends and other of my lasting and durable interpersonal 
relationships, all these relations where we have smaller conflicts and often switch between the 
roles as offenders and victims. The original context for Jesus and Matthews call for 
forgiveness was the life of brothers and sisters in the first Christian parishes. But is it a 
possible position to preach “seventy times seven” when the “conflict” consist of mass rape of 
thousands of women in Bosnia or the genocides in Rwanda or Cambodia? Is it a sustainable 
position to meet mass murderers with the virtue of unconditional forgiveness after Holocaust? 
“This is cheap grace”, says Jeffrie Murphy and has inspired the Danish philosopher Thomas 
Brudholm in his research on TRC and his important book Resentment’s Virtue – Jean Améry 
and the refusal to forgive. 
 Brudholm builds his philosophical analysis on two different empirical resources. He 
uses a text from Holocaust survivor Jean Améry where he argues for the right of the victim 
not to forgive the unforgivable and explores the alternative position of resentment. Brudholm 
uses the concept of resentment in line with Murphy, as moral anger and resistance against evil 
and oppression. Brudholm also uses a number of texts from members and participants in TRC 
in South-Africa where forgiveness is described as the only really health bringing virtue for the 
victims and for the nation as a whole. Brudholm does not deny that forgiveness under specific 
circumstances deserves to be called a moral virtue, but he defends a position where 
resentment also is a virtue and a necessary position in a reconciliation process. I read 
Brudholms book as an argument to include the wrath into the Ethics of reconciliation. His 
analysis deals first of all with the worst and most serious conflicts in the modern societies: 
The genocides and crimes against humanity. But his thinking is also relevant for interpersonal 
conflicts. 
 
A therapeutic language 
 
In Tutus writings and other texts from the hearings in TRC, there are many stories about 
victims who were willing to forgive, but also some about those who refused. Brudholm found 
a lot of examples where representatives from TRC went far in the direction of pressing people 
towards forgiveness, and also situations where resentment and wrath literally were diagnosed 
as hindrances on the road to healing and reconciliation. The reconciliation is clothed in a 
therapeutic language, and “healing wounds from the past” is the favored metaphor used to 
describe the process. Using this language from the medical and psychological areas to 
describe the experiences of victimized and oppressed people leads the writers very near a 
position where the victims are “ill”. Resentment and anger are signs of continuing illness. 
Brudholm refers from a testimony Mrs. Savage gave for the commission. Desmond Tutu 
himself tells the story (Brudholm Resentment: p. 55 Tutu Forgiveness p. 146):          
 
A white woman is a victim of a hand-grenade attack by one of the liberation 
movements. A lot of her friends are killed. And she ends up having to have open-heart 
surgery, and she goes into the ICU. She comes to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to tell her story. And she says, “You know, when I came out of hospital, 
my children had to bathe me, had to clothe me, had to feed me. And I can’t walk 
through the security checkpoint at an airport – I’ve still got shrapnel inside me – so, all 
kinds of alarms go off when I walk through.” Do you know what she said? (Tutu 
asks). She said, of this experience that left her in this condition? It has – can you credit 
it – she says, “It has enriched my life.” She says, “I’d like to meet the perpetrator, I’d 
like to meet him in a spirit of forgiveness. I would like to forgive him.” Which is 
extraordinary. But then, she goes on to say ”I hope he forgives me.” 
 
 Tutu holds forth this case as an example that “ought to leave people quite speechless at 
the wonder of it all.” Brudholm comments that Tutu did not accept any limitations on 
forgiveness. In the referred case about Mrs. Savage, Brudholm went to the original transcripts 
from the actual hearing. He found that after the quotation Tutu used in his book, she also 
made a long statement about all the pain and misery that the attack on her brought on her 
entire family. This part of her statement never figures in Tutu` use of her case. What is this? 
Does Desmond Tutu only have the category “useful pain”, and not a category for the 
meaningless and useless? Brudholm has also another objection of great ethical importance (p. 
55): 
 
Is resentment so immoral or harmful and forgiveness so noble and valuable that it is 
always and unconditionally good and praiseworthy to overcome resentment? The hope 
that one will be forgiven is at least conventionally the prerogative of the sinner or, 
more broadly, the person who, intentionally and responsibly, has done wrong to 
another. When victims of terrorism hope that those who dropped the bomb can forgive 
them, perhaps one should consider that damage a too strong appreciation of 
forgiveness can do to people’s sense of responsibility and culpability. 
 
 Tutu and the other architects behind the TRC model in South Africa need the critic 
coming from philosophers as Murphy and Brudholm. Their intentions have been the very 
best, and we shall never forget that South Africa managed the transition from Apartheid to 
democracy in a nonviolent way. Therefore they still deserve their positions as heroes in the 
history of conflict resolution and reconciliation. But the rather naïve therapeutic talk about 
letting go of resentment and moral wrath as the only possible way to individual and social 
healing, need to be corrected, both from psychological, philosophical and theological sources. 
Maybe it is not correct to formulate a universal statement which says: “No future without 
forgiveness.” Murphy and Brudholm are pointing in other directions. So do many victims of 
violence, including the sons I told about in the opening. They can tell stories from lives where 
forgiveness of the perpetrators was impossible for different reasons, but where recovering and 
certain forms of reconciliation have still been possible. Other victims testify that it is possible 
to forgive, but that forgiveness is not the opposite of resentment. The reconciliation process 
can hold both phenomena. 
 
Contextual theology 
 
I choose to read Murphy and Brudholm in this direction. The alternative is a harsh one. Then I 
would say that they are defenders of retribution, revenge and violent solutions in the conflict 
resolution processes. What Murphy primarily defends is what he calls retributive emotions, 
the right of the victim to resist what happened with anger towards offenders as well as 
offences. He even uses the term “moral hatred”, so he also allows some sort of hatred a 
legitimate place in the process following violence and serious crime. But Murphy does not 
defend retribution and revenge in the legal system. Punishment, yes, but the punishment shall 
be in the hands of the State to prevent both offenders and victims from the terrible forces 
which are hidden in the phenomenon of revenge. 
 Is Hannah Arendt wrong, than, when she makes her famous statement about 
forgiveness in the book The Human Condition12, proposing that the concept of forgiveness 
should be spread from the religious context into the entire world as a universal virtue? Is not 
this exactly the program of Desmond Tutu, TRC and also Robert D. Enright and his staff in 
The International Forgiveness Institute in Madison, Wisconsin? All the modern mediators and 
researchers who include the phenomenon of forgiveness in their thinking of conflict 
resolution processes love the following passage from the great Jewish philosopher Hannah 
Arendt13: 
 
The discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of 
Nazareth. The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and articulated it 
in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a strictly secular 
sense. 
 
What Hannah Arendt does, is so to say to formulate a program for contextual 
theology. In her text she explores how the virtue of forgiveness grew out of antic Greek 
(stoic), roman and also Jewish thinking. What Jesus of Nazareth does, is to make the appeal 
radical, and to connect it with the thinking of God as a forgiver. This is “contextual” in 
various senses of the word. First Arendt says that experiences and reflections emerging in a 
religious context have relevance outside in the secular world. And the other way around: 
Theology and religious thinking are certainly standing in a dialectic relationship to the secular 
culture surrounding them: To do Christian theology is to reflect on the Christian tradition and 
the culture in the very same movement, and to contribute to culture and society. 
 I still think that Hannah Arendt and Desmond Tutu deliver convincing arguments 
about the role forgiveness can play in conflict resolution among individuals and groups in our 
world today. But I also think that Jeremy Murphy and Thomas Brudholm have made some 
important contributions which bring us further into a sustainable and even more realistic 
thinking about reconciliation when they tell us that moral anger and resentment also have 
their legitimate places in the process.  
I can see two demanding challenges here, one for the philosophy of law and the 
jurisprudence system, and one for the theology and religious thinking: How is it possible to 
keep the moral wrath and earnestness which are necessary when we deal with the worst 
violent offences and crimes against humanity, without landing in a position where we defend 
retribution, revenge and death penalties? How is it possible to keep the image of God as a 
judge and the image of God as a forgiver without landing in a position where we picture God 
as a violent patriarch who demands a bloody sacrifice before he can forgive? To put it short: 
Is a nonviolent philosophy of law and a nonviolent theology at all possible? Let me use the 
rest of this article to underline some of the challenges I see for a contextual Christian theology 
today. 
 
Agnus Dei 
 
René Girard has made some important contributions to the philosophy of religion and 
theology with his works on sacred violence and the Scapegoat mechanism14. He explores how 
violence is a primary and threatening force in all human societies, and how the sacrifice cult 
and the scapegoating are cultural instruments which arise to make it possible to overcome the 
problem of violence and to survive. To place the guilt on the back of the scapegoat and 
sacrifice it, is an ancient form of conflict resolution. Girard finds the mechanism in different 
religious systems dealing with conflicts between the divine and the human sphere, and he also 
finds scapegoating in secular milieus in modern societies.  
I haven’t got the space to fold out his wonderful argument here, but his radical 
statement is that Christianity represents the ultimate break with the scapegoat mechanism. In 
the Bible we can see the break anticipated in Job’s book and by Deuterojesaja, but in the 
narratives about Jesus Christ in the gospels, it is fulfilled: God unmasks the scapegoating and 
sides with the victims against the violators. This is the mystery the Christian church is 
cerebrating when Agnus Dei is song in the liturgies and the psalms. In my words: God is not 
the violent patriarch who claims revenge. God sides with the suffering victims. 
 In the book Violence Renounced15, a group of theologian researchers have published 
texts inspired of Girard’s thoughts. Girard himself has written a postlude, and here he says 
that God identifies with the scapegoat in the death of Christ. God choose to be the scapegoat 
of his people to lift mankind out of the scapegoating culture once and for all. (p. 319). This is 
a radical way of using theology and even Christology as a basis for social critics. It reminds 
me of the theologian Karl Barth16 who in the German debate about death penalty in 1950, 
argued that any sort of death penalty or atonement through death, is blasphemy after Golgata 
where Christ died for our sins once and for all. For Lutheran ears it sounds peculiar to make 
these direct analogies from Christology to philosophy of law and even politics. But it is 
fascinating to meet the thinking of Barth and Girard who both make radical ethical 
conclusions from the Christian Doctrine: God has chosen the Agnus Dei once and for all. 
Please let further sacrificing of scapegoats stop!    
 
Nonviolent atonement 
 
Several theologians have been inspired by Girard and have used his thoughts about  
violence and scapegoating to criticize and reconstruct the Christian theology of reconciliation. 
Feminist theologians have criticized images of God as a violent Father. Theologians as 
Howard Zehr17 and J.D. Weaver have delivered important criticism of the elements of violent 
punishment theories in catholic and protestant theologies. They both come from the 
Mennonite movement with its long tradition in nonviolence and peacemaking, and they use 
this background in efforts to construct a new and nonviolent theology of reconciliation.  
 Weaver’s book has the programmatic title The Nonviolent Atonement18. He starts his 
argument by pointing out that it is a deep and alarming kinship between the right wing in 
American philosophy of law and conservative theology. I think he is right, and we can find 
the same positions in Europe. The first claims retributive punishment and death penalty 
arguing that this is absolute necessary to bring Justice into society. The second follows 
Anselm’s objective doctrine of reconciliation and teaches that God had to claim punishment 
and atoning death to save his honour and appear as the just Judge. Both teach that violent 
punishment is absolute necessary for the case of justice, in human conflicts and in the conflict 
between God and mankind. They operate with an absolute law of balancing Justice which 
both God and man have to follow: The sin has to be punished, and the punishment has to be 
proportional with the degree of sin.   
In his book Weaver tries to find an alternative nonviolent theology, following the 
classical Christus Victor motif 19from the early Church Fathers, and inspired by Girard: God 
did not kill Jesus Christ on Golgata to punish sin. God sides with the victim and does not 
claim a bloody sacrifice to be reconciled. The evil forces in the world are responsible for the 
killing of Jesus. Weaver moves the drama of atonement and reconciliation away from 
Anselm’s heavenly courtroom and set up the scene in this world, where God sides with all the 
wounded and oppressed in an ongoing battle against the Evil.   
 I have much sympathy with the pacifist theologians from the mennonite tradition, and 
I find Girard inspiring both in my work as theologian and researcher in criminology. But one 
question remains unsolved for me, both in my theology and philosophy of conflict resolution, 
and that is the thoughts put forward by Jeremy Murphy and Thomas Brudholm: Moral wrath 
and deep earnestness are also necessary when we meet the enormous and terrifying field of 
violence, oppressions and massacres. We have to forgive the perpetrators, says Tutu. We have 
to retaliate and punish them, say many serious voices arguing that impunity is dangerous in a 
state which should be governed by law. Are the alternatives so simple, a soft one and a harsh 
one, both in theology and in jurisprudence? Does the emphasizing of forgiveness lead to a ban 
on resentment and moral wrath, and does the earnestness and anger against the Evil lead to 
revenge and violent retribution? 
 
God as the Judge 
  
I my opinion we have important resources in Christian theology and tradition to deal with 
these difficult questions. And I agree with Hannah Arendt: The insights and experiences from 
the religious rooms should not stay there, locked up, they should be shared with the 
surroundings. Theologians should take active part in the important ethical and political 
discussions about the role of violence in conflict resolution. Since Anselm of Canterbury in 
109920 and even longer, these themes has been dealt with in the Christian churches. Some 
times theology has served as legitimating ideologies for brutal regimes, death penalty and 
oppressive penal practices. But this is not the full story of the long lasting relationship 
between the church and the state and the jurisprudence system. The church history shows 
many examples where theologians have recommended nonviolent ways of dealing with 
crimes and conflicts, following Jesus from Nazareth who even asked God to forgive the men 
who tortured him and nailed him to the cross. 
Resentment can be a virtue and moral anger the only possible and meaningful attitude 
against Evil. This position leads me to the following short draft of a theology of 
reconciliation: The God of reconciliation is not only the one who forgives the offenders. God 
is also the one who meets Evil with wrath and resentment and the one who judges the 
offenders and gives the victims restitution and justice. I will do what ever I can to tear to 
pieces the images of God as a violent patriarch, but we should not construct theology which 
no longer has room for the image of God as a judge.   
A theology of reconciliation which consists only of forgiveness, and no longer moral 
anger and judgement, is a theology which has betrayed the victims. It is possible to move so 
far away from Anselm’s forensic and juridical theology that we loose some very important 
elements in the Christian tradition. All theology is contextual. I our social context people are 
still struggling for justice, victims are begging to be heard, longing for compensation. A good 
courtroom and a good judgement create rooms where both the offender and the victim are 
taken care of. So should also the theology of reconciliation.          
Knud E. Løgstrup pictures the scene of the coming Judgement in a thought-provoking 
way in his book Skabelse og tilintetgørelse21. First he declares that it is intolerably provoking 
when Jesus of Nazareth forgives the perpetrators he meets without any conditions. What sort 
of practice is this? What about the victims? How dear Jesus forgive the offenders without any 
sort of just compensation for the other side? Løgstrup states that we have to read the stories 
about the forgiving Jesus in light of the Christian hope: God will one day arise all the victims 
of history and give them restitution and justice. In this light, and only in this light, is the 
Christian virtue of forgiveness meaningful. For of course: We cannot wait for heaven. We 
have to live and work in prolepsis, in the hope of a future which has already started: A 
consequence of the Christian virtue of forgiveness and the Christian hope of a coming justice 
for the victims is hard work here and now on the side of the victims in this society. 
The three sons I told about in the beginning of this article have as far as I can 
understand come far in the reconciliation process after childhoods dominated of violent 
patriarchs. They have recovered physically and mentally. They have met women, experienced 
love, got children and created families without violence. They are educated and have got good 
jobs. They have managed to establish other masculine strategies than their fathers: Nonviolent 
strategies. They have liberated themselves from Imago Patri and have not gone into Imitatio 
Patri. Arne and Mogens have kept contact with their fathers into their old age, and they have 
tended to them and taken care of them. Still they will not say that they have forgiven their 
fathers or reconciled with them. The last relational steps in the reconciliation process are 
missing. I understand this as a consequence of the lack of remorse and acceptance of guilt by 
these fathers. It is very difficult, maybe impossible to forgive a person who is not guilty in his 
own self-understanding. 
Maybe Desmond Tutu would say that the sons still should forgive their fathers and get 
rid of the last elements of moral anger and resentment they bear with them. I cannot ask them 
to forgive, in respect for the demanding reconciliation process they have gone through. I 
cannot ask them to oppose the resentment they still feel, because I think this emotion is an 
important part of their own earnest moral decision: “Never again! I will not be a violent 
patriarch.” 
Bjørn uses a minimalistic theology of reconciliation when he says: “If God chose to 
forgive my father, I will have nothing against it.” Is not this an important part of theology, 
elaborated from a reading of the first commandment in the Decalogue? Man is not God. 
Therefore man shall be spared for efforts to act divine. Only God can forgive the 
unforgivable. It is not possible to say exactly where the limits for human forgiveness should 
be drawn. Some people have a capacity to forgive which is literally unbelievable. But to set 
up unconditional forgiveness as a Christian virtue in all situations, is oppressing, maybe even 
blasphemous. Only God can forgive unconditional by Grace alone, and we shall be spared to 
act as God. 
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